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NOTES
"[B]etween the Devil and the Deep
Blue Sea:* A Look at the Fifth
Amendment Implications of Probation
Programs for Sex Offenders Requiring
Mandatory Admissions of Guilt
BY BRENDAN J. SHEVLIN**
INTRODUCTION
he Fifth Amendment states "No person shall be compelled
m any criminal case to be a witness against himself."' What
these words mean has changed over time and is still the subject
of much debate today In the context of the probation of sex offenders, the
degree of protection the Fifth Amendment requires is of particular
importance. Mental health experts overwhelmingly agree that a sex
offender must admit his guilt for treatment and rehabilitation to be
successful.2 Sex offenders are generally very reluctant to fully admit their
guilt, or even that they committed a crime at all An admission of guilt
requirement in sex offender treatment programs conflicts with the idea that
a defendant should not be made a witness against himself. The Supreme
Court has not ruled directly on this issue, and it has been the source of
"Thomas v. United States, 368 F.2d 941,945 (5th Cir. 1966).
* J.D. expected 2000, University of Kentucky.
'U.S. CONST. amend. V
2See Jessica Wilen Berg, Note, Give Me Liberty or Give Me Silence: Takang a
Stand on FifthAmendmentlimplicationsfor Court-Ordered Therapy Programs, 79
CORNELL L. Rhv 700, 702 (1994).
3SeeDavidB. Wexler, TherapeuticJurisprudence and the Criminal Courts, 35
WM. & MARY L. REV 279,285 (1993).
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
much confusion in the lower courts. This Note argues that, unless use of
such admissions m future prosecutions is prohibited, conditioning parole
on an admission of guilt violates the Fifth Amendment privilege against
self-incrimination. While the state interest in obtaining an admission of
guilt is quite compelling, it can still be served with relatively moderate
concessions to convicted sex offenders. Finally, tis Note proposes that
grants of immunity for statements made m sex offender programs would
eliminate the fear of self-incrimination while preserving the state's interest
m compelling admissions of guilt in its effort to successfully treat sex
offenders.
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE
PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION
The notion of a privilege against self-incrimination has a history that
precedes the Constitution and the Bill of Rights. The idea emerged as a
reaction to the oppressive procedures used during the Spanish Inquisition
and the persecution of Puritans in England. Defendants were commanded
to testify against themselves and often were tortured if their answers were
not to the tribunal's liking.4 The privilege was finally recognized in
England in 1641, when Parliament reversed the heresy conviction of a man
who had been convicted because he refused to testify against himself.5 This
privilege became part of English law and was unported to the colonies with
the rest of the common law The privilege became particularly dear to the
colonists because of the coercive tactics of British colonial offiCials.6 After
the Revolutionary War, many of the former colonies drafted constitutions
containing the right against self-incrimination. The privilege was mcorpo-
rated into the original Bill of Rights in 1789 7
A useful starting point is to examine the elements of the privilege
against self-incrimination. "To receive Fifth Amendment protection, a
person's statement or act must (1) be compelled, (2) betestimomal; and (3)
incrimmate the person in a criminal proceeding."8 However, the protection
4 See ANDREW D. WEINBERGER, FREEDOM AND PROTECTION: THE BILL OF
RIGHTS 47 (1962).
5See id.
6 See Mary A. Shem, The Privilege Against Self-Incrmnation Under Siege:
Asherman v. Meachum, 59 BRoOK. L. REv 503, 508 (1993).
7 See id.
8 Matthew Solomon, Fifth Amendment at Trial, 86 GEO. L.. 1694, 1694
(1998).
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extends to any proceeding, as long as the responses could be used against
the person in a later criminal case.9 Tins gives the protection a broad
application, as it can be asserted any time a person fears the information
sought nght be used against him in a subsequent criminal proceeding. In
addition, prosecutors andjudges are not allowed to comment to thejury on
a defendant's silence, nor can there be any presumption of guilt inferred
when a person exercises ins or her Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimnation.10 As one legal scholar articulated, "[a]t the core of the
privilege is the notion that the state may not penalize individuals for
refusing to answer potentially incriminating questions."' 1 The broad
application of the privilege is limited by the requirement that the testimony
must be "self-incrimiating," meaning that the potential future mcrim a-
tion must be a reasonable concern and not an imaginary threat.12 The
reasonableness requirement is set out in Hoffman v. United States.13
Hoffman also stands for the idea that the protection not only extends to a
reasonable fear that the answers sought could be used against the person in
a criminal trial, "but likewise embraces those winch would furush a link
in the chain of evidence needed to prosecute the claimant for a.. crime."' 4
Tins shows the breadth of protection the Supreme Court has given through
the Fifth Amendment: it extends to answers that could be used m discover-
ing evidence against the person and protects the answers themselves from
being used as evidence. In addition, the risk protected against is incrimma-
tion, not prosecution. Therefore, regardless of whether prosecution is
unlikely, the protection remains if there exists a reasonable threat of
incrimination.5 Tins is inportant because the threat of incrimination that
defendants often assert is a fear of committing perjury, which is frequently
not prosecuted. The Hoffman Court also stated that the protection against
self-incrimination extends not only to actual incriminating statements, but
also to statements that could possibly provide a link to incriminating
evidence if a person chose to answer them.'6
9 See id.
10 See WEINBERGER, supra note 4, at 48.
u Shem, supra note 6, at 503.
'
2See Solomon, supra note 8, at 1699-1700.
'
3 Hoffinan v. United States, 341 U.S. 479 (1951). See Solomon, supra note 8,
at 1699 (citing Hoffman).
14 Hoffrman, 341 U.S. at 486.
15 See Berg, supra note 2, at 706.
16 See Hoffman, 341 U.S. at 486.
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II. RAZOR V COMMONWEALTH
Despite this traditionally broad interpretation, many courts have found
little or no conflict between the Fifth Amendment and requiring convicted
sex offenders to admit guilt m order to be eligible for parole. In Kentucky,
the sex offender program requires such an adussion,17 as demonstrated m
the recent case of Razor v. Commonwealth."8 In Razor, the defendant was
convicted ofcommittingnumerous sexual offenses mvolvingthree children
over a number of years.'9 Razor maintained his innocence throughout the
trial and at sentencing. The Jefferson Circuit Court granted Razorprobation
on condition that he enroll in the Kentucky Corrections Cabinet Sexual
Offender Treatment Program. 0 The Sex Offender Program had the
customary admission of guilt requirement, and Razor insisted on mamtain-
ing his innocence. Eighteen months after Razor was probated, the
Commonwealth made a motion to revoke probation on the grounds that he
had not fulfilled the requirements of the sex offender program. Because of
Razor's failure to successfully complete the sexual offender treatment
program and admit his guilt, the Jefferson Circuit Court revoked the
probation and Razor appealed to the Kentucky Court of Appeals.2 ' The
court held, largely based on Minnesota v. Murphy,' the seminal Supreme
Court case in the area, that the requirement did not violate the Fifth
Amendment because the admission could not be used in future criminal
proceedings and therefore camed no threat ofself-incrimmation. The Court
of Appeals said:
[T]he Supreme Court clearly adopted the view that a sentence of
probation may be revoked due to the probationer's violation ofan express
condition of probation by refusmg to answer incrmniating questions, so
long as any incriminating responses which are made are not then used
agamst the probationer in a criminal proceeding. 3
The court reasoned that there was no threat of incrinunation in Kentucky
because information obtained by a parole officer is privileged by statute,
17 See KY. REV STAT. ANN. [hereinafter K.R.S.] §§ 197 400- 440 (Miclue
1996).
18 Razor v. Commonwealth, 960 S.W.2d 472 (Ky. Ct. App. 1997).
19 See zd. at 473.20 See id.
21 See id.
' Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420 (1984). Minnesota v. Murphy is
discussed infra notes 76-83 and accompanying text.
I Razor, 960 S.W.2d at 474 (referring to Minnesota, 465 U.S. at 437).
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thereby preventing it from being used as evidence m court.24 The statute
states, "[a]U information obtained in the discharge of an official duty by
any probation or parole officer shall be privileged and shall not be received
as evidence m any court."' In addition, the Kentucky statute regarding the
sex offender program states:
Communumcations made m the application for or in the course of a sexual
offender's diagnosis and treatment in the program between a sexual
offender or member of the offender's family and any employee of the
department who is assigned to work in the program, shall be privileged
from disclosure m any civil or criminal proceeding, unless the offender
consents m writing to the disclosure or the communucation is related to an
26ongoing criminal investigation.
The Court of Appeals held that because the required admissions could not
be admitted into court, any fear of self-incrimination was removed.27
Required admissions of guilt m sexual offender programs are perfectly
permissible if protections similar to the ones provided by Kentucky are
extended to the sex offender. Privileging or granting use immunity to the
admissions provides adequate protection against self-incrimination. While
the sex offender is given no choice but to admit to Is actions, the
information obtained cannot be used in a criminal case, which is what the
Fifth Amendment actually protects against.28
The problem is that most prosecutors are unwilling to surrender the
opportunity to obtain additional damning evidence against sex offenders,
or convicted criminals m general, and rarely grant them any sort of
immunity 29 Tls is understandable because it means foregoing the use of
potentially incrimmating evidence that could result in another conviction.
However, because successful treatment programs all demand that
participants admit their guilt, and because sex offenders who fail to admit
their guilt are three times more likely to have unsuccessful treatment,
30
See id.
z K.R.S. § 439.5 10 (Micle 1996); Razor, 960 S.W.2d at 474.
K.R.S. § 197 440; Razor, 960 S.W.2d at 474.
"See Razor, 960 S.W.2d at 474.
"See Scott Michael Solkoff, Judicial Use Immunity and the Privilege Against
Self-Incrtmination in Court Mandated Therapy Programs, 17 NOVA L. REV 1441,
1486 (1993).
29 See AKHIL REED AMAR, THE CONSTITUTION AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE:
FIRSTPRINCIPLES 50 (1997).30See Solkoff, supra note 28, at 1450.
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prosecutors might be wise to not take such a hard stance against granting
immunity In fact, in an era of prison overcrowding, such a concession
could prove vital to running a successful probationary program that would
reduce some of the strain on the nation's correctional facilities.
III. STATE V IMLAY
The leading case for the proposition that forcing convicted sex
offenders to admit their guilt as a condition of probation violates the Fifth
Amendment is State v. Imlay.31 The facts in that case were analogous to
Razor v. Commonwealth.32 Imlay, a sex offender who refused to admit his
guilt at trial, was offered probation as an alternative to incarceration.
However, a condition of the probation was that the sex offender take part
in a treatment program that required him or her to admit guilt. Imlay
fulfilled all of the requirements of the treatment program except the
admission of guilt condition. The head of the treatment program deter-
mined this made Imlay unsuitable for the treatment program, and a
probation revocation proceeding was initiated in the same district court that
granted him probation. Imlay's probation was revoked because of his
failure to fulfill the admission of guilt requirement of the treatment
program. He was sentenced to five years in the Montana State Prison.3 3 On
appeal, the Supreme Court of Montana stated "it is clear that the defen-
dant's incarceration at the Montana State Prison is directly related to Ins
refusal to admit that he committed a crime."'34 The court went on to say, "it
is clear that in this case the defendant is being subjected to a penalty that
he would not otherwise be subjected to if he would simply admit his
guilt. '35 The court held that such a penalty for maintaining one's right
against self-incrimination was prohibited by the Fifth Amendment.
The court relied upon three points in making its holding.36 First, "the
defendant still had the right to challenge his conviction."'3 Any admission
of guilt could be used against him in an appeal. Second, the reliability of
any admission would be in doubt because of the compulsion surrounding
31 State v Imlay, 813 P.2d 979 (Mont. 1991), cert. grantedsub nom. Montana
v. Imlay, 503 U.S. 905, and cert. dismissed, 506 U.S. 5 (1992). See Solkoff, supra
note 28, at 1442; Berg, supra note 2, at 702 (citing heavily to State v. Imlay).32 See supra notes 18-27 and accompanying text.33 See Imlay, 813 P.2d at 980-82.
3Id. at 982-83.351Id. at 985.
36 See id.
37Id.
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it. Third, an admission of guilt would not only violate the protections ofthe
Fifth Amendment, but it would also constitute committing or admitting to
perjury 38 These are the grounds most commonly cited for upholding the
Fifth Amendment protection against attempts at compelled admissions of
guilt.3 9 One complication in such scenarios is that, especially m cases of sex
offenders, it may be very difficult to obtain evidence for prosecution
without the defendant's testimony However, this does not mean that the
defendant's Fifth Amendment rights should be revoked m order to aid in
prosecution.40 This brings to light the two interests that hang m the balance
m tis controversy The state has a compelling interest in rehabilitating sex
offenders and preventing them from sexually assaulting others. Treatment,
rather than punishment, serves the state's interest in rehabilitation.4i In
addition, there is great desirability m rehabilitating rather than nnpnsonmng
those who can be treated. Prisons suffer from overcrowding, so rehabilita-
tion and outpatient programs offer attractive alternatives. Treatment
programs are also less costly than prisons.42 In addition, the probationers
can be given their liberty while packed court dockets are not further
burdened and financial resources are not drained through lengthy proceed-
mgs.43 Probation has become "a necessary and integral part of our
correctional system."
These are significant considerations wich should not be undermined
by the sweeping privilege agamst self-incrimination. Rather, these
considerations can be more than adequately served by privileging the sex
offender's discussions with his treatment supervisor or by granting his
statements immunity from being introduced into evidence. Privilegmg the
information does not affect the way states choose to run their sex offender
38 See id.
39 Interestingly, the State of Montana alleged in its brief to the U.S. Supreme
Court that, m Montana, "statements made m therapy cannotbe used in a subsequent
cnmmal prosecution." If this was true, the Imlay case would have been the same
scenario as in Razor v. Commonwealth, and under the Razor Court's reasonmg
would not violate the Fifth Amendment. Brief for State of Montana at 16,503 U.S.
905 (1992) (No. 91-682).4 See Solkoff, supra note 28, at 1446.
41 See Berg, supra note 2, at 732.
42 See William A. Nelson, The New Inquisition: State Compulsion of Thera-
peutic Confessions, 20 VT. L. REV 951, 954 (1996).
43 See Mary T. Casey, Due Process in Probation Revocation v. Self-Incnmi-
nation: A Comparative Perspective for the Massachusetts Probationer, 17 NEW
ENG. J. ON CalM. & Crv CONFINEMENT 181,209 (1991).
44Id.
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programs. If the goal is rehabilitation, then that goal will be more fully
served by encouraging sex offenders to make the admissions of guilt that
states assert are vital to successful treatment. Unless the real goal is to get
additional convictions using the statements made in treatment, the state is
not asked to surrender much by granting immunity
At the same time, there are very valid reasons for upholding the Fifth
Amendment protection against potentially limiting interpretations.
Historically, the Fifth Amendment has been viewed as a significant check
on government power over individuals. 45 Along those same lines, it exists
to discourage the government from using coercive techniques which it
likely would use or be tempted to use in the Fifth Amendment's absence.
It restricts the state's authority and helps guarantee that the state meet its
burden ofproofin criminal cases (rather than compel individuals to convict
themselves). The Fifth Amendment also represents the idea that a person
should not be made to go through the psychological trauma ofbemg forced
to incriminate oneself or commit perjury. In addition, it reinforces the right
to privacy that society values.' The Supreme Court has said that "[t]he
immediate and potential evils of compulsory self-disclosure transcend any
difficulties that the exercise of the privilege may impose on society in the
detection and prosecution of crime."47 Considerations of both state and
individual interests are significantly affected by the court's decisions
regarding compelled admissions of guilt as a requirement of probation.
The Imlay court looked to the so called "penalty cases" for precedent
in determining that a required admission of guilt as a condition of probation
violated the protections of the Fifth Amendment. These cases employ the
same sort of balancing of interests discussed above. The two leading cases
on the issue, both closely analyzed in Imlay, are Thomas v. United States"s
and Gollaher v. United States.49
IV THOMAS V UNITED STATES
In Thomas, the case upon which the Supreme Court of Montana relied
most heavily in its decision in State v. Imlay,5° the defendant asserted his
1S See Shem, supra note 6, at 509.
4See id. at 509-11.
4 Hoffinan v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 490 (1951) (quoting United States
v White, 322 U.S. 694, 698 (1944)).
48 Thomas v. United States, 368 F.2d 941 (5th Cir. 1966).
41 Gollaher v. United States, 419 F.2d 520 (9th Cir. 1969).
50 State v. Imlay, 813 P.2d 979 (Mont. 1991), cert. granted sub noma. Montana
v. Imlay, 503 U.S. 905, and cert. dismissed, 506 U.S. 5 (1992).
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innocence throughout trial but was eventually convicted for bank robbery
Still protestingins innocence at the sentencing hearing, the defendant came
before the same judge who presided at trial." The judge, convinced of the
defendant's guilt, extended the following proposition to the defendant:
If you will come clean and make a clean breast of this thing for once
and for all, the Court will take that into account in the length of sentence
to be nposed. If you persist, however, m your denial, as you did a
moment ago, that you participated in this robbery, the Court also must
take that into account. Now which will it be?52
Confronted with these two choices, the defendant still mnamtained his
innocence. The trial judge then immediately imposed the maximum
sentence allowed. The Thomas Court characterized the situation
confronted by the defendant as follows:
The two "ifs" which the district court presented to Thomas placed
him m a terrible dilemma. If he chose the first "if," he would elect to
forego all of the above-noted post-conviction remedies and to confess to
the crime of perjury, however remote his prosecution for perjury might
seem. Moreover, he would abandon the right guaranteed by the Fifth
Amendment to choose not to be a witness against himself, not only as to
the crime of which he had been convicted, but also as to the crane of
perjury. His choice of the second "if' was made after the warning that the
sentence to be imposed would be for a longer term than would be if he
confessed. From the record, it is clear that an ultimatum of a type wluch
we cannot ignore or approve confronted Thomas. Truly, the district court
put Thomas "between the devil and the deep blue sea. 54
The Court found this choice to be a violation of the Fifth Amendment, as
the defendant was dealt a"judicially imposedpenalty 55 for maintaming his
right not to incriminate himself. The Thomas case is a classic example of
a defendant being forced to make an unconstitutional choice. A majority of
circuits follow the Thomas decision, stating that choices where the
defendant is puished for not admitting his guilt are unconstitutional.56
51 See Thomas, 368 F.2d at 943-44.52Id. at 944.
' See id.
5Id. at 945.
551d. at 946.
56 See Berg, supra note 2, at 714.
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V GOLLAHER V UNITED STATES
Gollaher v. United States 7 takes the opposite position from Thomas m
"penalty" situations. Gollaher was a case much like Thomas m that a
defendant was given a longer sentence for failing to admit his guilt at
sentencing. The Ninth Circuit was very focused on the state's rehabilitative
goals in determmmg whetherthe increased sentence violated the protection
against self-mcrnm ation.58 The court said:
This case presents a dilemma which every trial judge faces at the time
of sentence. It is almost axiomatic that the first step toward rehabilitation
of an offender is the offender's recognition that he was at fault. In the
present state of the criminal law, there is no doubt that punishment is still
a consideration in the imposition of sentence, especially where non-
violent or economic crimes are involved. But to the extent that rehabilita-
tion is the objective, no fault can be found of the judge who takes into
consideration the extent of a defendant's rehabilitation at the time of
sentence.
5 9
The court then held that the imposition of a harsher sentence in the face of
a defendant's refusal to admit guilt was perfectly permissible, and
moreover encouraged open judicial disclosure of the practice.6 Gollaher
therefore stands for the idea that the state's interest in rehabilitating
convicted criminals can ovemde a person's protection against self-
incrimination. Tins is the case pointed to by states and prosecutors to
justify requirng an admission of guilt under the threat of revocation of
probation. By focusing on the state's rehabilitative goals, the Gollaher
decision puts few limits on the discretion of judges to punish persistent
claims of innocence by convicted criminals. However, it is just such
exertions of state authority that the Fifth Amendment was createdto protect
against.61 To allow the state to strip the Fifth Amendment of any clout
because the state claims it has a valid interest in compelling admissions of
guilt goes against the broad protection the privilege against self-mcrmima-
tion has traditionally provided.
s' Gollaher v. United States, 419 F.2d 520 (9th Cir. 1969).
Si See id. at 530.
59 Id.60 See id.
61 Shem, supra note 6, at 508.
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VI. PUNITIVE OR NOT
Clearly, the trial court in Thomas placed a heavy price on the defendant
for asserting his right not to incriminate himself. The trial court imposed
the maxinum sentence strictly because he refused to admit his guilt.62 By
conditioning a lesser sentence on an admission of guilt, the court effec-
tively punished the defendant for asserting his Fifth Amendment rights.
Importantly, this is the very situation that a defendant is confronted with
when a required condition of probation is an admission of guilt. Such was
the situation mImlay, where the judge made the defendant choose between
admitting the crime and being free as long as he fulfilled his probation
obligations, or maintaining Ins innocence and going to prison.63 Judicial
proponents of conditioning sentencing on admission of guilt have
commonly stated that defendants are not really punished m cases where
probation is revoked; the result is only to remstate rather than enhance the
original sentence and, moreover, probation is only a discretionarypnvilege
given to those who aid in the fulfillment of the state's mterest.6 The courts
that have ruled on this issue have likewise drawn "a distinction between
enhancing a sentence and lowering one." 65 Courts that emphasize this
distinction often use it as a way of getting around the Thomas rule. They
focus on the fact the person demed a reduced sentence or probation is not
getting a longer sentence as a result of his silence; rather, he is simply not
getting the privilege of a reduction or probation resulting from complying
with the state's desires." The State of Montana made this very argument
in its brief to the Supreme Court in the Imlay case. The State claimed that
"revocation of probation is not a penalty that triggers Fifth Amendment
protections." 7 Specifically, the State argued that the probation was an
attempt at lemency by the trial court. Thus, when Imlay did not adhere to
the specific requirements of the sex offenderprogram, but asserted his Fifth
Amendment privilege instead, revoking Ins probation did not result in a
penalty 61 The Attorney General for Montana said:
62 See Thomas v. United States, 368 F.2d 941,944 (1966).
63See State v. Imlay, 813 P.2d 979 (Mont. 1991), cert. granted sub noma.
Montana v. Imlay, 503 U.S. 905, and cert. dismissed, 506 U.S. 5 (1992).
'See Lisa F Orenstem, Sentencing Leniency May Be Denied to Criminal
Offenders Who Fail to Express Remorse at Allocution, 56 MD. L. REV 780, 791
(1992).
65 Solkoff, supra note 28, at 1469.
66 See id.
67Bnef for State of Montana at 9, Montana v. Imlay, 503 U.S. 905 (1992) (No.
91-687).68See id. at 11.
1999-2000]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
Tins choice did not place Imlay m a coercive situation where Fifth
Amendment concerns might be controlling because Imlay did not have to
choose between making incriminating statements or suffering a poten-
tially impermissible penalty. The suspended sentence given to Imlay on
the condition that he undergo sex offender therapy was a lement sentence,
designed to provide him with the benefit of treatment m a community-
based program.69
Arguably the choice presented to Imlay represents a penalty situation.
The fact that Imlay received leniency with the initial offer of probation
does not put him m any less of a penalty situation when he must choose to
forego his right against self-incrimination or else lose the benefit of
probation and go to jail. This choice put Imlay between the proverbial
"rock and a hard place." As one commentator has observed, "[p]lamly, a
defendant who is told that his or her sentence will be lessened is under
equal compulsion to waive the privilege as is the defendant who is told that
his or her sentence will be increased. The practical result is the same
regardless ofwhether one uses a negative or positive linguistic spm. ' 70 This
characterization seems right on point. The effect on the defendant ofhavmg
probation revoked is the same whether it is classified as a penalty or the
deial of a benefit that only those who comply with the state receive. The
constitutional rights of defendants should not be evaluated on the basis of
such a spurious distinction. Clearly, there is a tremendous difference
between bemg Incarcerated and being free only to adhere to probationary
restrictions. The defendant m Imlay was penalized with ajail sentence for
seeking the protection of the Fifth Amendment to the same extent that the
defendant in Thomas was penalized with a longer sentence for asserting
this same right. Inequality in treatment based on the assertion of the
privilege not to reveal incriminating evidence against oneself should be
classified as falling into the "penalty" cases such as Thomas, and the same
logic should be applied.
A similar criticism has been raised where expressing remorse during
the sentencing stage is rewarded with a reduction in a defendant's sentence.
Such a choice puts the defendant in a similar penalty position.7' The
government interest in rehabilitating crimmals remains the same. However,
the defendant is faced with the choice between maintaming his innocence
at the cost of staying in jail for a longer period, or giving up Ins constitu-
69 Id. at 13.
70 Solkoff, supra note 28, at 1469.
71 See Orenstem, supra note 64, at 792.
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tional right not to incriminate himself in return for a reduced sentence.72
The threat of incrimination remains for the defendant, despite the convic-
tion, given that admissions could be used against him or her onappeal.73 As
in the probation scenario, there is a significant risk that the admissions of
guilt are insincere.74 In effect, the defendant is being bribed to make an
admission, with little downside other than the surrender of a constitution-
ally protected right. As in the probation situation, there are solutions other
than tossing out the privilege against self-incrimination.75
VII. DIRECTION FROM THE SUPREME COURT
The seminal Supreme Court case dealing with the probation of sex
offenders is Minnesota v. Murphy.76 There, a defendant in a sex offender
treatment program admitted to raping and killing a woman on an occasion
prior to the one for which he was convicted.77 Under the terms of his
probation the defendant was required to "be truthful" with is probation
officer.78 The defendant raised the defense that he did not think is
responses could be used against him, and argued that the fact he was
required to be truthful with his probation officer put him in the classic
penalty situation.79
The Supreme Court held that the Fifth Amendment generally has to be
asserted by the defendant for it to be applied, and that in this case, the facts
were not such as to allow the privilege to be self-executing (as in the
penalty situations). The Court further said that in the "penalty cases," the
states did something to try to make the defendant forego the protections of
the privilege, whereas here the defendant simply chose not to assert it."0
However, the Court, in dictum, made some interesting observations about
what would constitute a penalty situation. The Court said:
There is thus a substantial basis in our cases for concluding that if the
State, either expressly or by implication, asserts that invocation -of the
See id.
See id.
74 See id. at 793.
' See id. at 792.
16 Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420 (1984).
" See id. at 423-25.
78 See id. at 422.
79 See id. at 434.80See id.
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privilege would lead to revocation of probation, it would have created the
classic penalty situation, the failure to assert the privilege would be
excused, and the probationer's answers would be deemed compelled and
inadmissible in a criminal prosecution.
81
In addition, the Court ruled, "a State may not impose substantial penalties
because a witness elects to exercise his Fifth Amendment right not to give
incriminating testimony against himself." 2 Importantly, it noted "a State
may validly insist on answers to even mcrminating questions and hence
sensibly administer its probation system, as long as it recognizes that the
required answers may not be used in a criminal proceeding and thus
eliminates the threat of incrimination.
83
Although the Murphy decision went against the sex offender, and
the Supreme Court has never directly ruled on the issue of condition-
ing probation on a requirement of an admission of guilt, the Court's
statements can be interpreted to mean that such a condition of probation
would fall into the "penalty cases" and be inpernnssible. The Court's
comments about eliminating the possibility that responses could be
submitted against a defendant in a criminal court, thereby removing the
threat of incrimination, are accurate. That is, once a defendant's fear of
an admission being used against him or her m a criminal case is alleviated
by privileging commumcations between treatment counselors and sex
offenders, or by immunizing admissions of guilt, treatment programs would
be free to require these admissions of guilt. This would seem to protect the
primary interest asserted by states-rehabilitation-and allow for
compelled admissions without inftrngig upon the right not to incriminate
oneself.
VIII. BALANCING APPROACH
Some commentators have been very focused on the state's interest in
determining whether a penalty situation exists.8 4 Illustrative is Jessica
Wilen Berg, who asserts that when courts are strictly interested in
punishing a defendant, a defendant's willingness to admit guilt should
not be a consideration. However, when a court's ann is at least partially
rehabilitative, Berg argues that the fact that a defendant has taken
8 Id. at 435.82Id. at 434 (quoting Lefkowitz v. Cunningham, 431 U.S. 801, 805 (1977)).
13 Id. at 435-36 (emphasis added).
14 See generally Berg, supra note 2.
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responsibility should be a consideration in determining his fate. 5 In this
respect,. Berg contends that when a rehabilitative interest is asserted by
the state, the Fifth Amendment privilege should be "balanced" against
this interest. Despite the inequalities and potential for coercion, Berg
suggests that the damage to the Fifth Amendment is outweighed by the
benefits of a more workable criminal system. 6 More specifically,
Berg proposes a balancing test in which the first step is determin-
ing whether the Fifth Amendment applies, and then, if it does apply,
the court determines whether ignoring its effect violates the Consti-
tution. 7 When determining whether there is a violation, the state's
rehabilitative goals are to be considered. In addition, under this
balancing test, the state's interest in rehabilitation should be considered
predominant over the threat of coercing a confession. Finally, as Berg
observes, the strength of the Fifth Amendment claim is contingent upon
the likelihood of prosecution based on the self-incriminating state-
ments."
In the Imlay case, the Attorney General for Montana argued that the
Fifth Amendment did not apply because the state was concerned with
rehabilitation rather than punishing defendants.8 9 Comparing the threat of
incrimination to the state interest involved, the Montana Attorney General
said "such an unrealistic threat carries little weight when considered with
the otherwise ovemding concerns ofthe state in supervising its probation-
ers and administering appropriate treatment programs that foster
rehabilitation."" The rhetoric of the Attorney General for Montana
parallels the balancing approach discussed by Berg because it reasons that
where there is a strong governmental interest in rehabilitation, there is far
less of a problem regarding self-incrimination.91 However, such an
approach makes short work of the privilege against self-incrimination. In
effect, it says that the privilege should disappear as a constitutional right
when it conflicts with the well-intentioned rehabilitative policy ofthe state.
Importantly, the Supreme Court has said that a person is entitled to the
protection of the Fifth Amendment based on whether answers would be
85 See id. at 715-16.
16 See id.
17 See id. at 723.
8 See id. at 727-28.
9See Brief for State of Montana at 22, Montana v. Imlay, 503 U.S. 905 (1992)
(No. 91-682).
" Id. (emphasis added).
91See id. at 22.
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incriminating, not on whether a strong likelihood of prosecution exists.92
Such an approach cannot be said to protect the traditional idea that the Fifth
Amendment is a check against the power of the state over the individual.93
The balancing proposals do harm to the traditional application and breadth
of the protection against self-incrimination. As the Supreme Court held
when addressing the surrender of the right of self-incrimination:
Tis guarantee against testimomal compulsion, like other provisions of
the Bill of Rights, "was added to the ongmal Constitution in the convic-
tion that too high a price may be paid even for the unhampered enforce-
ment of the criminal law and that, m its attainment, other social objects of
a free society should not be sacrificed." 94
The Attorney General of Montana appears willing to do just what the
Supreme Court was concerned about: sacrifice the fundamental protections
of the Fifth Amendment for the state's interests m the safety of its citizens
and m rehabilitating crinmals.95 The Attorney General's brief further states
that "[b]ecause the probation system involves the overwhelming interest of
the state m supervising its probationers and protecting the public, the threat
of revocation and revocation itself are constitutionally valid exercises of
the state's authority to protect the public and determine the appropriate
treatment for convicted defendants."9 The protections against self-
incrimination became mcompatible with Montana's desired statutory
scheme, and so it tried to assert that its interests trumpedthe interests ofthe
individual. This sort of state action is exactly what the Fifth Amendment
is designed to protect against. An attack on the Fifth Amendment has
implications beyond the protection against self-incrimination, because
ignoring provisions of the Constitution when convenient to do so is a
slippery slope.
This being said, the goals of the above-mentioned "balancing"
proponents could just as easily be achieved by implementing rules insuring
the confidentiality of statements made during treatment, or by immunizing
a defendant's statements from being used against him or her m a criminal
proceeding. Once the potential for criminal consequences stemming from
9 See Berg, supra note 2, at 706.
See Shem, supra note 6, at 510.
94 Hoffian v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 (1951) (quoting Feldman v
United States, 322 U.S. 487,489 (1944)).
95 Brief for State of Montana at 22, Imlay (No. 91-682).96Id. at 30.
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a defendant's admissions is eliminated, the Fifth Amendment is no longer
a sleld against self-incriminationf 7 There is no constitutional right to
remain silent once the possibility of using the responses m a criinmal case
is foreclosed. The threat of incrimination being removed, the courts would
be free to demand whatever kind of statement they wanted as a condition
of probation.98 Indeed, the Supreme Court acknowledged tis in Hoffman:
"If Congress should hereafter conclude that a full disclosure by the
witnesses is of greater importance than the possibility of pumshing them
for some crime in the past, it can, as in other cases, confer the power of
unrestricted examination by providing complete immunity "99 In such
cases, the defendant will not have the Fifth Amendment to Ide behind, and
the goal of more effective rehabilitation by requiring an admission of guilt
can be fulfilled.
IX. MACE v. AMESTOY: ONE COURT'S SOLUTION
Mace v. Amestoy'00 is a case wherein the court came to a sensible
solution that accorded with the protections of the Fifth Amendment. In
Mace, a writ of habeus corpus was sought by a sex offender after the
Vermont Supreme Court held that revocation of his probation was proper
for his failure to admit to the crnmes for which he was convicted."0' The
defendant admitted committing sexual assault on his stepdaughter andpled
guilty, but vehemently demed that he had sexual intercourse with her, as
was accused. 2 The defendant pled guilty to a sex crime carrying a lesser
penalty than the crime for sexual intercourse. He was put on probation, a
condition of which was his participation in a sex offender treatment
program. He continuedto deny the allegations of sexual intercourse forthe
six months he was in the treatment program. Despite evidence and
testimony to corroborate Ins claims, Ins treatment counselor insisted that
he was lying and that this was a "stumbling block" to treatment.113 The trial
97See Solkoff, supra note 28, at 1492.
98 See id.
99 Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 490 (1951) (quoting McCarthy v.
Arndstem, 266 U.S. 34,42 (1924)).
" Mace v. Amestoy, 765 F Supp. 847 (1991). See Nelson, supra note 42, at
968 and Solkoff, supra note 28, at 1481-82.
101 See State v. Mace, 578 A.2d 104 (Vt. 1990), habeas granted, Mace v.
Amestoy, 765 F Supp. 847 (D. Vt. 1991).
" ,See Mace, 765 F Supp. at 848.
103 See id.
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court revoked the defendant's probation, the Vermont Supreme Court
affirmed the revocation, and a writ of habeas corpus was sought.
The Federal District Court for Vermont agreed with the defendant that
commanding him to make an admission while m treatment violated his
right against self-incrimination, as he could still be prosecuted for that
crime as a result of pleading to a lesser one at trial."° It held this put the
defendant in the classic penalty situation in that the defendant could have
his probation revoked for refusing to make incriminating statements. 0 5 The
Court then went on to say- "[c]ontrary to the state's position, the state has
the burden of eliminating the threat of incrimination. If the state wishes to
carry out rehabilitative goals in probation by compelling offenders to
disclose their criminal conduct, it must grant them immunity from criminal
prosecution."'0 6 This middle-ground approach compromises without
abandoning the constitutional freedom from compelled self-incrimination.
Both sides get what they want; the state keeps its desired condition of an
admission of guilt in its treatment program because, with immunity, the
statements cannot be used against the defendant in a criminal case. In
addition, proponents of the Fifth Amendment are assured its broad
protection where it is applicable to protect the rights of the individual
against state intrusion.
In addition, the court in Mace v. Amestoy went on to attack the
"balancing" position referred to earlier:
[T]he Vermont Supreme Court's focus on the state's rehabilitative
purpose in compelling the petitioner to admit that he had sexual inter-
course with his stepdaughter is misplaced, because what is at issue is the
disclosure, not the purpose of the disclosure. Certainly the state has a
legitimate rehabilitative purpose in demanding full disclosure, but that
does not make the disclosure any less incriminating.10 7
This analysis could not be any more on point. No one disputes that the state
has a legitimate and compelling interest to rehabilitate sex offenders, and
should be given all reasonable means to pursue that interest. However,
when that interest conflicts with a constitutional right, the constitutional
right must be given its fall application. It cannot be merely sidestepped by
courts because it is inconvement when applied to rehabilitating sex
"I4 See id. at 851.
os See id.
101 Id. at 851-52.
,07 Id. at 852.
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offenders. The conflict must be acknowledged, and suitable treatment
options that do not violate the privilege against self-incrimination must be
instituted. As has been mentioned throughout this Note, a grant of
immunity or the privileging of communications between the sex offender
and his or her treatment counselor would give the state the right to demand
whatever kind of admission it wanted, as there would be no chance of
incrimination. This relatively minor concession would allow the states to
implement the type of treatment programs they are so eager to implement.
This raises the question of why immunity is not granted frequently in
orderto dealwiththis problem. There aretwo considerations in administer-
ing apolicy of immunity. As mentioned earlier inthis Note, prosecutors are
loath to extend this olive branch to defendants unless it some way
expediates further prosecution. Second, courts feel they would be
overstepping their authority in striking down the probation policies of the
executive branch, which traditionally give prosecutors broad discretion,
and thus hesitate to grant immunity 10I In addition, the concerns usually
expressed regarding grants of immunity to defendants do not apply to
immunizing the statements of sex offenders in treatment programs. In the
case of someone on probation, his or her guilt has already been determined.
Moreover, immunizing the statements of a probated sex offender does not
immunize the sex offender from a subsequent prosecution for another
crime. It simply prevents the sex offender's own statements from his court-
orderedtreatment program to be introduced against him in a future criminal
proceeding. °9 The state remains free to prosecute sex offenders for other
sex crimes; it is merely prevented from using statements made during the
treatment program as evidence against him. This eliminates the fear that
these sex offenders can evade the law the moment their admissions are
immunized from use in criminal cases.
CONCLUSION
The privilege against self-incrimination has been broadly interpreted
by the Supreme Court and cannot be set aside when inconvenient. The Fifth
Amendment is a valuable restraint upon the state's authority over
individuals. While the successful treatment of sex offenders is a legitimate
and important aim, procedures exist to achieve this goal apart from
sidestepping such an important protection of individual rights. Courts must
be consciously aware that they exist to serve the interests of justice, not to
10 See Solkoff, supra note 28, at 1487-88.
109 See id. at 1490.
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overlook the rights of the individual in order to facilitate a state's rehabili-
tation programs. The Fifth Amendment is a last line of defense against
potential abuses of state power and should not be discarded when a state
asserts the Amendment is too protective or cumbersome. If a state wants
to require admissions of guilt it can do so, but only by granting immunity
to statements made by sex offenders while in treatment.
